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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal requires us to decide whether 
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner 
exhausts administrative remedies prior to filing a civil rights 
lawsuit as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), or in the alternative, 
whether federal equitable tolling principles are applicable.  
Additionally, we must determine if the District Court erred 
when it dismissed, for failure to state a claim, the portion of 
Antonio Pearson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that it deemed 
timely.1   
 
I. 
 
                                              
1 We thank pro bono counsel, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, 
Evans & Figel, PLLC, for their able representation of 
Pearson. 
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 Pearson is serving a life-term in the Pennsylvania 
prison system. According to Pearson, “Department of 
Corrections employees engaged in a two-year campaign of 
harassment against him in retaliation for the filing of a civil 
lawsuit and at least seven grievances.”  Appellant’s Br. at 3–
4.  Pearson’s allegations are discussed below.   
 
 Beginning in 2006, Pearson filed a civil lawsuit against 
a number of prison officials in the Somerset County Court of 
Common Pleas.  Thereafter, Pearson filed his first grievance 
alleging that corrections officers had performed a cell search 
to confiscate and read his legal materials on November 23, 
2006.  In a grievance addressing a January 9, 2007 incident, 
Pearson claimed that a corrections officer had refused to 
provide him with grievance paperwork unless Pearson 
informed the corrections officer what his grievance was 
about.  Pearson filed another grievance that alleged that 
Corrections Food Service Instructor Don Kot punched him in 
the arm several times while he was working in the Dietary 
Department on February 2, 2007.  Next, Pearson filed a 
grievance after a corrections officer told him on February 13, 
2007 that he was not permitted to cite to the Department of 
Corrections’ Code of Ethics in his grievances.  Additionally, 
Pearson filed a grievance addressing a February 26, 2007 
incident, in which he claimed that he was terminated from his 
dietary position by Corrections Food Service Managers Paul 
Fisher and Joe Reams and E-Unit Manager Ed Mulligan for 
filing his civil lawsuit and for filing the grievance about Kot’s 
alleged assault. 
 
 Pearson also claims that he was subjected to a series of 
cell searches and relocations in retaliation for filing his civil 
lawsuit and grievances.  Pearson states that on September 24, 
2007 he was denied a meal by corrections officers because he 
“was running his mouth,” and on that date he filed a 
grievance claiming that he “was still being black-balled from 
getting a job.”  App. at 68.  Pearson also details an argument 
with Sergeant Clippinger that occurred on February 29, 2008 
wherein he claims that Clippinger, without provocation, 
yelled at him in an aggressive manner in front of several other 
inmates stating that Clippinger was not afraid of Pearson’s 
grievances.   
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 Pearson was later assigned to a “blockworker” position 
on August 17, 2008.  Pearson alleges that on October 19, 
2008 Sergeant Frank Karl learned of his appointment and 
took steps to remove Pearson from the position; Pearson 
claims that he attempted to file a grievance but corrections 
officers removed it from his mailbox.  Pearson was removed 
from his job the next day on October 20, 2008 by Karl.  
According to Pearson’s amended complaint, Unit Manager 
Hunter told him that he was terminated from his position 
because of the grievances that he had filed.    
 
II. 
 
 Pearson filed a complaint alleging violations of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 on February 28, 2009,2 and was later granted 
leave to amend his complaint.3  The defendants filed a motion 
to dismiss, and the Magistrate Judge recommended granting 
the motion on the basis that all of Pearson’s “non-trivial” 
allegations that occurred prior to March 1, 2007 were time-
barred under Pennsylvania’s two year statute of limitations.  
App. at 4–6.  Additionally, the Magistrate Judge concluded 
that Pearson’s claim based on his termination from his 
position as a blockworker was timely, but that he failed to 
state a claim because there were “no facts that allow a 
plausible inference that [the termination] was caused by any 
protected activity of plaintiff’s.”  App. at 7.  The Magistrate 
Judge reasoned that “if a retaliatory animus can be legally 
derived from temporal proximity of an inmate’s grievances or 
lawsuits to a decisionmaker’s decision, then frivolous inmate 
litigation [would] become[] the legal equivalent of a breeder 
                                              
2 Pearson’s complaint was signed on February 28, 2009 and 
received by the court on March 3, 2009.  “The federal 
‘prisoner mailbox rule’ provides that a document is deemed 
filed on the date it is given to prison officials for mailing.”  
Pabon v. S.C.I. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
3 Pearson’s amended complaint named thirty-nine defendants.  
However, the Magistrate Judge determined that only the 
allegations against Kot, Fisher, Reams, Mulligan, and Karl 
(collectively, “defendants”) were specific enough to warrant 
service and dismissed the balance of Pearson’s remaining 
claims. 
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reactor.” App. at 8.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s Report and Recommendation. 
 
 Pearson filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
Report and Recommendation claiming that the Magistrate 
Judge failed to toll the statute of limitations while Pearson 
exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA 
and erred by not accepting the allegations of his complaint as 
true with respect to his retaliatory discharge claim.4  In a 
second Report and Recommendation in response, the 
Magistrate Judge relied on Congress’ intent to curb frivolous 
inmate litigation and concluded that because “[t]he choices of 
what remedies to afford, where inmates can file in state court, 
and the exhaustion requirements in state court are up to the 
state and the litigant” the PLRA is not a statutory 
prohibition.5  App. at 17.  Additionally, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that application of equitable tolling principles was 
inappropriate because Pearson made no showing that prison 
officials had prevented or obstructed Pearson from 
completing the grievance process to run out the statute of 
limitations.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s second Report and Recommendation.   
 
                                              
4 Pearson’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation were filed sixteen days late.  Pearson 
claimed that this delay was based on the unavailability of the 
prison law library due to the winter holidays.  The Magistrate 
Judge noted Pearson’s untimely objections and addressed 
them on the merits, and the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.  As the 
District Court addressed Pearson’s claims on the merits, 
despite his untimeliness, we address them as well. 
5 At argument, counsel for the Secretary of the Department of 
Corrections asserted that the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning 
could be understood to mean that because the PLRA was too 
porous—at least partially because the PLRA only required 
exhaustion of administrative remedies by litigants that are 
currently incarcerated—it cannot be considered a statutory 
prohibition under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute.  See Ahmed 
v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is 
inapplicable to former prisoners).  
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III. 
 
A. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 
114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  We also exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s application of statutes of limitations and 
tolling principles.  Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 
2000).  Lastly, we exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s interpretation of state law.  Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. 
KSI Trading Corp., 563 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
B. 
 
 Congress has not codified a statute of limitations 
applicable to suits for the vindication of civil rights and has 
instead “determined that gaps in federal civil rights acts 
should be filled by state law, as long as that law is not 
inconsistent with federal law.”  Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 
536, 538 (1989); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  “[A] § 1983 
claim is governed by the statute of limitations that applies to 
personal injury tort claims in the state in which such a claim 
arises.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Additionally, a state’s tolling principles also govern § 1983 
claims when they do not conflict with federal law.  Id. 
 
 As Pearson’s § 1983 claims arise in Pennsylvania, we 
must apply Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations. Under 
Pennsylvania law, personal injury claims must be brought 
within two years of the accrual of the claim.  42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 5524(7).  Pennsylvania law also provides that “[w]here 
the commencement of a civil action or proceeding has been 
stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of 
the stay is not a part of the time within which the action or 
proceeding must be commenced.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
5535(b) (emphasis added).  The PLRA states that “[n]o action 
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under 
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 
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facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  Therefore, the timeliness 
of Pearson’s § 1983 claims hinges on whether the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement is a “statutory prohibition” under 
Pennsylvania’s tolling statute, and if so, how long the statute 
of limitations is tolled on Pearson’s claims. 
 
 We have previously addressed this issue in non-
precedential opinions.  Most recently, we stated: “[t]hough 
this Court has not spoken on the issue, several courts of 
appeals have held that, because exhaustion of prison 
administrative remedies is mandatory under the [PLRA], the 
statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions should be 
tolled while a prisoner exhausts.”  Pressley v. Huber, 562 
Fed. App’x 67, 70 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); see also 
Paluch v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t Corr., 442 Fed. App’x 690, 694 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that “[b]ecause exhaustion of 
prison administrative remedies is mandatory under the 
[PLRA], the statute of limitations available to § 1983 actions 
may be tolled while a prisoner exhausts.”)   
 
 The Seventh Circuit has analyzed this issue based on 
Illinois’ tolling statute, which contains the same “statutory 
prohibition” tolling provision as the Pennsylvania statute.  
Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521–22 (7th Cir. 2001).  
The Johnson court held that Illinois’ tolling statute applies to 
the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA and noted the 
“procedural catch 22” that would exist if the statute of 
limitations were not tolled.  Id. (“The ‘catch 22’ in this case is 
self-evident: the prisoner who files suit under § 1983 prior to 
exhausting administrative remedies risks dismissal based 
upon [the PLRA]; whereas the prisoner who waits to exhaust 
his administrative remedies risks dismissal based upon 
untimeliness.”).  The Fifth Circuit similarly concluded, based 
on a textual reading of Louisiana’s tolling statute, that 
Louisiana’s statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner 
exhausts administrative remedies.  Harris v. Hegmann, 198 
F.3d 153, 156–59 (5th Cir. 1999).  These two opinions are 
instructive as the tolling statutes contain language similar to 
Pennsylvania’s tolling statute.6 
                                              
6 Other circuits, by explicitly or implicitly utilizing the 
doctrine of federal equitable tolling, have concluded that 
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 Additionally, the district courts in Pennsylvania have 
almost uniformly concluded, by construing opinions of other 
courts of appeals and our non-precedential opinions on this 
issue, that Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations is tolled while 
a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies.  See, e.g., 
Walton v. Walton, No. 13–1109, 2014 WL 4348170, at *6–7 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2014); Robinson v. Prison Health Servs., 
No. 10–7165, 2014 WL 2452132, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 
2014); Ozoroski v. Maue, No. 08–0082, 2009 WL 414272, at 
*6–7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009).  
 
 One district court reasoned to the contrary, stating that 
“[t]he limitations period for an inmate’s civil claim does not 
run from the date of exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
nor is it tolled while remedies are being exhausted, even 
though exhaustion of those administrative remedies is 
mandatory.”  Vantassel v. Rozum, No. 08–0171, 2009 WL 
1833601, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 25, 2009), aff’d on other 
grounds, 469 Fed. App’x 110 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).7 
 
  In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate 
Judge in this case focused on congressional intent to reduce 
prisoner litigation and concluded that the PLRA is not a 
“statutory prohibition” under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute 
because the issue of whether to provide and utilize 
administrative remedies is left to the state and litigant; the 
                                                                                                     
statutes of limitations in other states are tolled while a 
prisoner exhausts.  See Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 322–
24 (2d Cir. 2011); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942–43 
(9th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596–97 (6th 
Cir. 2000).  As we are not deciding this case on the basis of 
equitable tolling, we note the existence of these cases, but do 
not rely upon them. 
7 We note that the same Magistrate Judge and District Judge 
in this case also presided over Vantassel.  In that case, we 
affirmed the judgment on other grounds, notably, because the 
prisoner in this case had filed a faulty Rule 60(b) motion and 
because the prisoner’s notice of appeal for his Rule 59(e) 
motion was untimely, and therefore we lacked jurisdiction to 
review it.  Vantassel, 469 Fed App’x at 111–12. 
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District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation.  This 
reasoning confuses the issue.  There is no ambiguity in the 
PLRA: it is clearly a statutory prohibition that prevents a 
prisoner from filing § 1983 actions until the prisoner exhausts 
all administrative remedies.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).   
 
 Additionally, the availability of state remedies is 
irrelevant as the PLRA does not require a prisoner to rely on 
state remedies in lieu of a § 1983 claim.  Rather, the PLRA 
merely requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior 
to the initiation of a § 1983 claim.8  This conclusion is 
supported by nearly all of the precedents in this and other 
circuits. 
 
 As we have concluded that the PLRA is a statutory 
prohibition that tolls Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations 
while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies, we need 
not address Pearson’s federal equitable tolling argument. 
 
C. 
 
 We now address Pearson’s timely retaliatory discharge 
claim.  “When considering an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, we must accept all well-pled allegations in the 
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party.”  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 
F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).  We construe the pleadings of 
pro se litigants liberally.  Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 
369 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
                                              
8 We also do not agree with the Secretary of the Department 
of Corrections’ argument that the PLRA is not a statutory 
prohibition because the statute is too porous, apparently 
because it only applies to those who are currently 
incarcerated.  The PLRA prohibits currently incarcerated 
prisoners from filing § 1983 claims prior to exhausting 
administrative remedies, which is a statutory prohibition 
under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5535(b).  To the extent that the 
PLRA does not require former prisoners to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to filing § 1983 suits, it is of no 
moment, as current prisoners still face a statutory prohibition. 
10 
 
 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A claim is facially 
plausible when the facts alleged in the complaint allow a 
court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable.  Id.  However, mere “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by conclusory 
statements” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.  
Id. 
 
 Pearson pleads in his complaint what could be 
considered a pattern of antagonism that evidences his 
retaliatory dismissal.  Perhaps even more importantly, 
Pearson also pleads in his complaint that Unit Manager 
Hunter told him that he was terminated in retaliation for filing 
his grievances.  Of course, his complaint is not without its 
weaknesses, as the last instance of antagonism, aside from an 
argument with Clippinger and his cell relocation, occurred 
nearly a year prior to Pearson’s termination.  While temporal 
proximity is often important to establish retaliation, “the mere 
passage of time is not legally conclusive proof against 
retaliation.”  Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 
(3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We must accept Pearson’s allegations as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in his favor.  Brown, 464 F.3d at 452.  
We find that Pearson has pled sufficient facts to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, especially when we 
consider his allegation that Hunter admitted that Pearson’s 
termination was retaliatory.  
  
IV. 
 
 Because we hold that the PLRA is a statutory 
prohibition under Pennsylvania’s tolling statute, we reverse 
the District Court’s order dismissing Pearson’s complaint.  
We remand the case to the District Court for a determination 
of whether Pearson exhausted his administrative remedies on 
all of his § 1983 claims.  Regarding the claims that the 
District Court initially determined were untimely, if the court 
determines that Pearson exhausted his administrative 
remedies, the court should then determine what period of time 
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is tolled during the exhaustion and whether those claims are 
timely.  With respect to Pearson’s retaliatory discharge claim, 
if the District Court determines that Pearson has exhausted his 
administrative remedies, the matter should proceed to 
discovery.  
